"Desperately Seeking Customs": To What Extent Does Judicial Creativity Stand in Contrast to the Principle of Legality?
An assessment of the contribution of the international criminal tribunals (ICTs) to the development of international law may not seem to be, at present, a wise choice as a matter for reflection since almost everything has been said and written on the most critical issue: The manner in which these courts interpreted, applied and developed customary international law. The debate often grew around the questions of where and how to draw the line between evolutive interpretation and the creation of new rules by the judges and consequently on the amount of judicial creativity to be considered acceptable for international criminal law to be consistent with the principle of legality.1 In general, it is acknowledged that at least those appointed as judges at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) had to engage in a partial exercise of judicial creativity.2 Indeed, some have claimed more bluntly that judicial creativity, that is to say the shaping of relatively vague existing international law rules in order to render them applicable in a criminal context, is the life and blood of international criminal law.3 This need was implicitly recognized already in the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg where it is said that the "law of war" listed in the IMT Statute is "not static, but it follows by continual adaptation the needs of a changing world".4
The task and opportunity "to assume responsibility for the further rationalization of international crimes"5 was taken up to a large extent by the ICTY and ICTR in the 1990s. It is impossible to give an adequate account of the approach followed by both the ad hoc ICTs -not to mention the role played more recently by the International Criminal Court or by the so-called mixed or hybrid courts such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon6 -to the identification or interpretation of applicable law or to the development of new rules. Hence, this paper will only briefly focus on the use by the judges of the two ad hoc Tribunals of pre-existing customary rules to identify their subject-matter jurisdiction, being quite evident
